Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Zoonotic spillovers of viruses have occurred through the animal trade worldwide. The start of the COVID-19 pandemic was traced epidemiologically to the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, the site with the most reported wildlife vendors in the city of Wuhan, China. Here, we analyze publicly available qPCR and sequencing data from environmental samples collected in the Huanan market in early 2020. We demonstrate that the SARS-CoV-2 genetic diversity linked to this market is consistent with market emergence, and find increased SARS-CoV-2 positivity near and within a particular wildlife stall. We identify wildlife DNA in all SARS-CoV-2 positive samples from this stall. This includes species such as civets, bamboo rats, porcupines, hedgehogs, and one species, raccoon dogs, known to be capable of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. We also detect other animal viruses that infect raccoon dogs, civets, and bamboo rats. Combining metagenomic and phylogenetic approaches, we recover genotypes of market animals and compare them to those from other markets. This analysis provides the genetic basis for a short list of potential intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 to prioritize for retrospective serological testing and viral sampling.

Establishing a Pre-COVID-19 Hospital Biopreparedness Initiative.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2)/coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has amplified the role of hospitals in infectious disease response and capacity building. In efforts to respond to the growing volume of cases, hospitals have become a microcosm for US pandemic response. The COVID-19 outbreak has highlighted that hospital preparedness for biological events, such as a pandemic, are often inadequate and dependent on leadership investment in biopreparedness. This article discusses the proactive decision, before COVID-19, that a Phoenix-based hospital system made to invest in high-consequence disease (HCD) preparedness. Within these efforts, a gap analysis was performed, which led to creation of an HCD subcommittee and corresponding efforts to address vulnerabilities and opportunities for improvement. From establishing enhanced personal protective equipment (PPE) and infectious disease training for frontline staff, to building an outbreak tracking mechanism for travel alerts within the electronic medical record, the HCD efforts of this hospital system created a stronger foundation to respond to biological events like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Dose, Infection, and Disease Outcomes for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Review.

The relationship between severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) dose, infection, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outcomes remains poorly understood. This review summarizes the existing literature regarding this issue, identifies gaps in current knowledge, and suggests opportunities for future research. In humans, host characteristics, including age, sex, comorbidities, smoking, and pregnancy, are associated with severe COVID-19. Similarly, in animals, host factors are strong determinants of disease severity, although most animal infection models manifest clinically with mild to moderate respiratory disease. The influence of variants of concern as it relates to infectious dose, consequence of overall pathogenicity, and disease outcome in dose-response remains unknown. Epidemiologic data suggest a dose-response relationship for infection contrasting with limited and inconsistent surrogate-based evidence between dose and disease severity. Recommendations include the design of future infection studies in animal models to investigate inoculating dose on outcomes and the use of better proxies for dose in human epidemiology studies.

COVID-19 false dichotomies and a comprehensive review of the evidence regarding public health, COVID-19 symptomatology, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, mask wearing, and reinfection.

Scientists across disciplines, policymakers, and journalists have voiced frustration at the unprecedented polarization and misinformation around coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Several false dichotomies have been used to polarize debates while oversimplifying complex issues. In this comprehensive narrative review, we deconstruct six common COVID-19 false dichotomies, address the evidence on these topics, identify insights relevant to effective pandemic responses, and highlight knowledge gaps and uncertainties. The topics of this review are: 1) Health and lives vs. economy and livelihoods, 2) Indefinite lockdown vs. unlimited reopening, 3) Symptomatic vs. asymptomatic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, 4) Droplet vs. aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2, 5) Masks for all vs. no masking, and 6) SARS-CoV-2 reinfection vs. no reinfection. We discuss the importance of multidisciplinary integration (health, social, and physical sciences), multilayered approaches to reducing risk ("Emmentaler cheese model"), harm reduction, smart masking, relaxation of interventions, and context-sensitive policymaking for COVID-19 response plans. We also address the challenges in understanding the broad clinical presentation of COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and SARS-CoV-2 reinfection. These key issues of science and public health policy have been presented as false dichotomies during the pandemic. However, they are hardly binary, simple, or uniform, and therefore should not be framed as polar extremes. We urge a nuanced understanding of the science and caution against black-or-white messaging, all-or-nothing guidance, and one-size-fits-all approaches. There is a need for meaningful public health communication and science-informed policies that recognize shades of gray, uncertainties, local context, and social determinants of health.

Prevention of COVID-19: Preventive Strategies for General Population, Healthcare Setting, and Various Professions.

The disease 2019 (COVID-19) made a public health emergency in early 2020. Despite attempts for the development of therapeutic modalities, there is no effective treatment yet. Therefore, preventive measures in various settings could help reduce the burden of disease. In this chapter, the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causing COVID-19, non-pharmaceutical approaches at individual and population level, chemoprevention, immunoprevention, preventive measures in different healthcare settings and other professions, special considerations in high-risk groups, and the role of organizations to hamper the psychosocial effects will be discussed.

Interdisciplinary Information for Infectious Disease Response: Exercising for Improved Medical/Public Health Communication and Collaboration.

Infectious disease threats like the novel coronavirus that emerged in late 2019 continue to demand an increase in preparedness and response capabilities. One capability that is both essential and consistently challenging is information sharing between responding organizations, particularly between public health agencies and health care providers. This policy analysis reviews the threat that infectious diseases continue to pose to the United States, and the role that the Hospital Preparedness Program can play in countering such threats. Current strategies for preparing for, and responding to, infectious disease outbreaks are also reviewed, noting some gaps that need to be addressed. Particular attention is given to challenges in information sharing that continue to hinder effective surveillance and response, despite advances in technology. The study looks at recommendations from biodefense organizations and experts in the field. It concludes with our recommendation that regulatory requirements and funding opportunities for health care institutions emphasize the importance of communication and training in relation to high consequence pathogens. We further recommend that providers in Ebola treatment hospitals be employed to train and educate providers in frontline hospitals in a 'train-the-trainer' model.

A Canary in a COVID Coal Mine: Building Better Healthcare Biopreparedness Policy.

The SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic has been devastating to the U.S. health-care system and sheds light on gaps in preparedness and response to biological threats. From limited personal protective equipment to staffing issues, hospitals are struggling to respond to the novel coronavirus outbreak. Unfortunately, hospital biopreparedness is a product of prioritization for hospital leadership and either exists or is neglected. Federal efforts to enhance health-care readiness have done little to drive true change across the U.S. health-care infrastructure. From optional efforts like the tiered hospital approach to special pathogens to the regulatory rule from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, federal efforts to build a resilient health-care infrastructure against biological threats are woefully inadequate and dependent upon hospital leadership priorities. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a need to implement regulatory requirements on health-care facilities to invest in continued preparedness for biological events.

Roadblocks to Infection Prevention Efforts in Health Care: SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 Response.

The outbreak of a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, is challenging international public health and health care efforts. As hospitals work to acquire enough personal protective equipment and brace for potential cases, the role of infection prevention efforts and programs has become increasingly important. Lessons from the 2003 SARS-CoV outbreak in Toronto and 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak in South Korea have unveiled the critical role that hospitals play in outbreaks, especially of novel coronaviruses. Their ability to amplify the spread of disease can rapidly fuel transmission of the disease, and often those failures in infection prevention and general hospital practices contribute to such events. While efforts to enhance infection prevention measures and hospital readiness are underway in the United States, it is important to understand why these programs were not able to maintain continued, sustainable levels of readiness. History has shown that infection prevention programs are primarily responsible for preparing hospitals and responding to biological events but face understaffing and focused efforts defined by administrators. The current US health care system, though, is built upon a series of priorities that often view biopreparedness as a costly endeavor. Awareness of these competing priorities and the challenges that infection prevention programs face when working to maintain biopreparedness is critical in adequately addressing this critical infrastructure in the face of an international outbreak.

Restricted and Uncontained: Health Considerations in the Event of Loss of Containment During the Restricted Earth Return of Extraterrestrial Samples.

The normal scope of an adequate public health response to released biological material is framed by working with biological vectors with known pathogenicity and virulence. Defining the scope of a response to the release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence enters into a novel and yet to be framed domain. A current case, in which extraterrestrial samples returned from a location such as Mars, which may harbor life as we know it, requires framing a public health response. An unintentional release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence may occur when biological containment mechanisms in the Earth-returning transport method are lost. This article raises initial public health and healthcare response questions during a return of extraterrestrial samples to Earth, in the event of its release from biological containment mechanisms: How does the public health community prepare for a response when there is release of samples that may contain potential extraterrestrial organisms from a planetary body or hardy terrestrial organisms surviving a round trip? If a mishap occurs during the return of these samples, what considerations need to be made to confine, decontaminate, and collect material in regions around the mishap? How will the public health community work with relevant government organizations to prepare the general public? The unknowns of exposure, potential extraterrestrial pathogenicity, and decontamination approaches underscore gaps in biopreparedness for this novel case from federal to local levels.

Cost Analysis of 3 Concurrent Public Health Response Events: Financial Impact of Measles Outbreak, Super Bowl Surveillance, and Ebola Surveillance in Maricopa County.

OBJECTIVE: To generate estimates of the direct costs of mounting simultaneous emergency preparedness and response activities to respond to 3 major public health events. DESIGN: A cost analysis was performed from the perspective of the public health department using real-time activity diaries and retrospective time and activity self-reporting, wage and fringe benefit data, and financial records to track costs. SETTING: Maricopa County Department of Public Health (MCDPH) in Arizona. The nation's third largest local public health jurisdiction, MCDPH is the only local health agency serving Maricopa's more than 4 000 000 residents. Responses analyzed included activities related to a measles outbreak with 2 confirmed cases, enhanced surveillance activities surrounding Super Bowl XLIX, and ongoing Ebola monitoring, all between January 22, 2015, and March 4, 2015. PARTICIPANTS: Time data were sought from all MCDPH staff who participated in activities related to any of the 3 relevant responses. In addition, time data were sought from partners at the state health department and a community hospital involved in response activities. Time estimates were received from 128 individuals (response rate 88%). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Time and cost to MCDPH for each response and overall. RESULTS: Total MCDPH costs for measles-, Super Bowl-, and Ebola-related activities from January 22, 2015, through March 4, 2015, were $224 484 (>5800 hours). The majority was for personnel ($203 743) and the costliest response was measles ($122 626 in personnel costs). In addition, partners reported working more than 700 hours for these 3 responses during this period. CONCLUSIONS: Funding for public health departments remains limited, yet public health responses can be cost- and time-intensive. To effectively plan for future public health responses, it may be necessary to share experiences and financial lessons learned from similar public health responses. External partnerships represent a key contribution for responses such as those examined. It can be expensive for local public health departments to mount effective responses, especially when multiple responses occur simultaneously.

Identifying Gaps in Frontline Healthcare Facility High-Consequence Infectious Disease Preparedness.

Hospital infection disease preparedness gaps were brought to the forefront during the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak. The ability of US hospitals to rapidly identify, isolate, and manage patients with potentially high-consequence pathogens is a critical component to health security. Since the EVD cases in Dallas, Texas, the continuity of hospital preparedness has been questionable. While certain hospitals were designated as EVD treatment facilities, the readiness of most American hospitals remains unknown. A gap analysis of a hospital system in Phoenix, Arizona, underscores the challenges of maintaining infectious disease preparedness in the existing US healthcare system.